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Review Essay 

Taking Globalization Seriously: Towards 

General Jurisprudence 

WILLIAM TWINING. GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY. London: 
Butterworths, 2000. Pp. 260. 
DORON M. K.ALIR.* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LAMP LIGHTER'S TRAGEDY 
When the Little Prince arrived at the fifth planet of his 
journey, he met the lamplighter. The little prince was 
not able to reach any explanation of the use of a street 
lamp and a lamplighter, somewhere in the heavens. 
Yet the lamplighter seemed to be extremely busy in 
performing his task. Once every minute he turned the 
light on and off. The little prince could not fathom the 
reason for this unusual habit. "Those are the orders," 
the lamplighter tried to explain. But the little prince 
was not convinced. The lamplighter made another 
attempt: "I follow a terrible profession. In the old days 
it was reasonable. I put the lamp out in the morning, 
and in the evening I lighted it again." "And the orders 
have been changed since that time?" asked the little 
prince. "The orders have not been changed," said the 
lamplighter. "That is the tragedy! From year to year 
the planet has turned more rapidly and the orders have 
not been changed!"1 
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Michael Dorf, Gideon Parchomovsky, and Andrew Perlman for their helpful comments, 
criticisms and suggestions. The usual disclaimer, however, applies vigorously. 
1. ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPERY, THE LITrLE PRINCE 47-48 (Katherine Woods trans., 
Harcourt Brace 1943). · 
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Though introduced more than sixty years ago, the 
lamplighter's tragedy neatly enca~sulates one of the pivotal aspects of 
the current age of globalization. From year to year the world has 
been witnessing ever-growing changes, while the existing legal 
orders-especially those concerning the planet as a whole, i.e., 
international law-are quickly becoming antiquated. In particular, 
the view that nation-states alone should monopolize international 
affairs is an increasingly inadequate proposition. In response; calls 
for paradigm shifts4 are emerging5-and not only in internatiomll law. 
Labor law,6 taxation,7 antitrust,8 corporations,9 and securities 
regulation10 are all subject to suggestions of revision in light of the 
2. The current age of globalization began in 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
followed by the other "Revolutions of 1989" (see Bruce Ackennan, The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REY. 771, 784 (1997) marked the dawn ofa new era-post Cold 
War-in world politics, economy, and law. 
3. See Louis Henkin, That S. Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORD. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999). 
4. Indeed, Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal work on the history of scientific research 
from which this tenn is borrowed (THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 66 (3d ed. 1996)), indicates that "crises are a necessary precondition for the 
emergence of novel theories." Id. at 77. Following Santos (see infra note 13), Professor 
William Twining acknowledges that we are in a state of"paradigmatic transition" (p. 201). 
Please note that page numbers in parenthesis throughout this Review Essay, and 
footnote references without a specified book or article, refer to its subject: WILLIAM TWINING, 
GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000). 
5. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisty, Exit and Voice in the Age ofGlobalization, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 167 (1999) (suggesting to replace the dominating Westphalian paradigm-a model of 
international relations that views global conflicts solely in tenns of the sovereign states that 
constitute the global arena-with a new, interest group-oriented transnational conflict 
paradigm.); see also John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Moveseian, The World Trade 
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000) (suggesting a new blueprint model for the 
WTO's structure; arguing that by facilitating jurisdictional competition and open capital 
markets the WTO can help reduce the power of interest groups while making national 
governments more responsive to their constituents' tastes). 
6. George Ross, Labor Versus Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. 
Sci. 78 (2000). 
7. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis ofthe 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). 
8. Russell J. Weintraub, Globalization's Effect on Antitrust Law, 34 NEW ENO. L. REV. 
27 (1999). 
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); 
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the 
Theory ofthe Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 CoLUM. J. TRANSNl\T'L L. 
213 (1999); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global 
Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 829 
(2000). 
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new epoch. 11 Still, the scope, depth, and range of transformations 
introduced by globalization appear to require more than a mere 
provisional revision of the different fields. They call for no less than 
a thorough rethinking of the "law of laws" itself-jurisprudence.12 
William Twining's Globalization and Legal Theory is one of the first 
attempts to respond comprehensively to that call.13 
Professor William Twining of the University College of 
London (UCL) is more than suited for the task. A self-proclaimed 
rooted-cosmopolitan,14 Twining was educated both at Oxford15 and 
the University of Chicago. Formerly the Quain Professor of 
Jurisprudence, a chair currently held by Ronald Dworkin, he is now a 
Research Professor at UCL. Throughout his long and distinguished 
career he has taught in Khartoum, Dar-es-Salaam, Belfast, Hong 
Kong, Kampala, Wasenaar (near Laidenk Bangalore, Belfast, Miami, 
and Boston, to name just a few places.1 A prolific writer, Twining 
has published books on legal theo1Ic,17 legal interpretation, 18 the law 
of evidence,19 and legal education. 0 He is the co-editor of the well 
10. See, e.g., Barry A.K. Rider, Global Trends in Securities Regulation: The Changing 
Legal Climate, 13 DICK. J. lNT'L L. 513 (1995); Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's 
Adaptation to Global Market Pressures, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1995). 
11. By now, an electronic search of articles containing the word "globalization" in their 
title yields the comforting message that ''your search has been interrupted due to a large 
number ofdocuments." 
12. Seep. 3 ("By the mid-1990s the discipline oflaw in the United Kingdom and, to a 
lesser extent, the United States was becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, but its theoretical 
branch, jurisprudence, seemed to have lagged behind."); p. 10 ("Globalization ... seemingly 
offers fundamental challenges to contemporary legal theory."). On the relationship between 
the terms "jurisprudence" and "legal theory," seep. 11 n.7. 
13. Twining cites and discusses at length another work on legal theory, with a post­
modern hue, which precedes his: BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD ANEW COMMON 
SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995). See in particular 
pp. 194-244. 
14. Twining borrowed the term from Ackerman (pp. 47, 50, 137) (citing Bruce 
Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitan 104 ETHICS 516 (1994)). 
15. Seep. 33 ("I began my study of law in Oxford in 1952, the year in which Herbert 
Hart was elected to the Corpus Chair of Jurisprudence in succession to A.L. Goodhart. So 
when I embarked on the study ofjurisprudence towards the end of my second year, I found 
myself at the cusp of two traditions of English legal positivism. I experienced both 
versions."). 
16. P. 247. 
17. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); 
WILLIAM TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT (1997). 
18. WILLIAM 1\VINING & DAVID MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES (4th ed. 1999). 
19. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE (1990); WILLIAM TWINING & TERENCE 
ANDERSON, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE (1991). 
20. WILLIAM T\VINING, ACADEMIC LAW AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT (1976); WILLIAM 
TWINING, BLACKSTONE'S TOWER: THE ENGLISH LAW SCHOOL (1994). 
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known Law-in-Context series (of which this latest book is a part), 
and-though by his own admission "not a committed Benthamite" 
(p. 104)-he is one of the greatest Bentham scholars of our 
generation.21 
Twining proposes that we take globalization seriously. He 
claims that "in this era of globalization there is a pressing need for a 
revival of general jurisprudence. "22 What is "general jurisprudence"? 
First and foremost, it is a relative term. It is not identical to universal 
or global jurisprudence. On the other hand, it focuses on more than 
one legal system. Indeed, Twining contrasts general jurisprudence 
with both "particular" and "global" jurisprudence. Set off against 
particular jurisprudence, general jurisprudence deals with questions 
that "are not confined to or derived from a single lefal system and 
they can be asked of many, if not all, legal systems."2 In that sense4general jurisprudence is thinner than particular jurisprudence.2 
Conversely, compared with global jurisprudence, "general 
jurisprudence is broader and more intellectually ambitious," since it 
"includes all the intermediate stages between two or more legal 
orders, traditions, or cultures, viewing law in the whole world and 
beyond. 'General' is relative in a way that 'global' is not."25 
Accordingly, general jurisprudence may include the description and 
analysis of various levels of law, including global (e.g., global 
environmental issues), international (e.g., relations between nation­
states), regional (e.g., the European Union), transnational (e.g., rules 
21. Twining serves as director ofthe Bentham Project at UCL. 
22. P. 13. Twining repeats this proposition throughout his book; see in particular 
chapters 2 (General and Particular Jurisprudence) and 9 (Epilogue). 
23. P. 39 (emphasis added). Twining offers at least three more accounts of general 
jurisprudence as opposed to particular jurisprudence in this chapter: John Austin's account 
("what I mean by 'General Jurisprudence,' the science concerned with the principles, notions, 
and distinctions which are common to systems of law.") (p. 22, citing JOHN AUSTIN, THE 
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954) (1863)); Ruth Gavison's 
account ("general jurisprudence, the attempt to analyze societies at their most genenil (like 
the attempt to analyze human nature) and identify those features common to all social 
organizations which might lead to the need for similar institutions and practices.") (p. 37, 
citing Ruth Gavison, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUEl'/CE OF 
H.L.A. HART 28 (Ruth Gavison ed. 1987)); and H.L.A. Hart's account ("[My theory] is 
general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system or legal culture, but seeks 
to give an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social and political 
institution with a rule governed (and in that sense 'normative') aspect.") (p. 38, citing }LL.A 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 239 (2d ed. 1994)). 
24. Indeed, both Ronald Dworkin and Atiyah & Summers have made the claim that the 
account provided by such jurisprudence could only be so thin that it will lack any substantial 
theoretical value. With that, the claim probably had been addressed to "general" in the sense 
of''universal" jurisprudence. For a discussion, see pp. 41-43. 
25. P. 254 (emphasis added). 
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for multi-national corporations), inter-communal (e.g., the relations 
between ethnic or religious groups), territorial state (e.g., the law of 
sub-national jurisdictions, such as Quebec), sub-state (e.g., religious 
law officially recognized in a plural legal ~stem), and non-state 
(e.g., the laws of subordinated peoples).2 In short, general 
jurisprudence encompasses theories that apply to more than one 
particular legal system, but not necessarily to all legal systems. 
While introducing at length the historical and theoretical 
background of the concept, Twining stops short of providing a 
substantial account of the content of general jurisprudence in the age 
of globalization. Rather, the central message of his work, as he puts 
it, "is one of complexity. It is intended to challenge simplistic 
assumptions and narrow reductionist perspectives rather than to 
present a neatly a packaged theory" (p. 247). Consequently, readers 
who anticipate a detailed account of the new general jurisprudence 
may feel somewhat unsatisfied. Part IV of this Review Essay 
suggests the beginnings of such an account. 
Another central claim Twining advances is the need to rethink 
comparative law from a global perspective.27 Two of the book's 
chapters are dedicated to this issue, concluding with a strong 
recommendation for the introduction of "cosmopolitan legal studies" 
into the legal curriculum. However, here as well Twining refrains 
from specifying the exact content of the theory he posits. 
Recognizing the weight of such a task, he admits, "this is a daunting 
program that is beyond the capacity of a single Mr. Palomar.28 Even 
outlining such a program is a large undertaking, which must be left to 
another occasion" (p. 190). One may only hope that such an occasion 
is soon to occur. 
My review proceeds in three parts. Part II provides an account 
of the jurisprudence of Globalization and Legal Theory. Due to the 
novelty of many of the issues discussed in the book, as well as their 
importance to the understanding of Twining's recommendations, I 
have provided a longer than usual account of several chapters. Part 
III touches upon one of the central jurisprudential dichotomies 
introduced by Twining-the distinction between general and 
particular jurisprudence. Twining compares different accounts of the 
distinction using pairs of canonical jurists. In particular, he compares 
26. P. 139 (discussing the different levels oflaw). 
27. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing chapter seven, 
Globalization and Comparative law); see also Epilogue, pp. 255-56. 
28. Twining's reference here is to Italo Calvino's MR. PALOMAR (William Weaver 
trans. 1985) (1983). 
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H.L.A Hart's Postscript29 with Dworkin's Law's Empire.30 In this 
part, I juxtapose Twining's record of this exchange with seemingly 
conflicting accounts provided by other commentators and suggest 
resolving the apparent conflict. Part IV brings to the fore the concept 
of general jurisprudence in the age of globalization. Placed in that 
context, I will suggest that a new general jurisprudence should 
respond to the challenges posed by globalization. I first identify the 
driving forces behind globalization, mainly new economic markets, 
the Internet, and the trend towards democracy. Then, I suggest that 
some of the current American schools of thought may respond to 
these very phenomena. Economic analysis of law, feminism, and 
critical race studies may all have something interesting to say on 
globalization. My last step is to propose that a transnational version 
of these theories should form the main body of a new global 
jurisprudence. 
In all, apart from its citation system,31 this thought-provokin~ 
work is a great read. Full of astute observations and catchy phrases, 3 
this eloquently written work succinctly conveys the multifaceted 
nature of globalization and its challenges to legal theory. Most 
importantly, it fires the opening shot in what will probably become a 
vehement debate over the nature of the new century's prevailing 
jurisprudence. 
29. The second edition ofHart's classic, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (supra note 23), which 
appeared in 1994, is identical to the first edition published in 1961 save for a postscript 
written in 1992. This addition to the book, which was edited by Penelope A. Bulluch and 
Joseph Raz, deals mainly with Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's theory [hereinafter HART, 
POSTSCRIPT]. 
30. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]. 
31. In the best Oxfordian tradition, the book uses the note-abbreviation method. Each 
citation is first abbreviated and then referred to only by its short form, with no reference to 
the original (full) citation. Thus, a reader who wishes to know what "BMR" means on p. 123 
n.1, will have to patiently go through the previous thirteen pages until reaching the answer. 
To top that, some of the abbreviations appear on a special list at the beginning of the book­
again with no reference; and, every twenty notes a new count begins. While it is rare to find 
kind words written about the Bluebook system of legal citation-indeed, the relation ofmost 
writers towards it often range from ridicule (see, e.g., Patrick M. McFadden, Fundamental 
Principles of American Law, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1999) ("With the cool 
detachment ofanthropologists describing human sacrifice among the Maya, the editors of the 
Bluebook thus calmly report on that particular human custom of legal citation.")) to serious 
criticism (see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343 
(1986))-it is safe to assume that most American readers will miss it here. My sincere hope 
is that later editions will be more user-friendly. 
32. I particularly enjoyed ''what color is Hercules' passport?" (p. 44); "[t]he bad-man is 
amoral rather than immoral" (p. 122); and "[c]ombine globalization and post-modernism and 
one has a dangerous liaison" (p. 195). 
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II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GLOBAL'IZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 
In depicting another work, Boaventura de Sousa Santos's 
Toward a New Common Sense,33 which he later describes as 
"probably the most important theoretical work to date on 
globalization and law" (p. 251), Twining writes: 
Substantial parts of the book had been published 
before and, although they have been extensively 
revised, the work moves along a variety of levels and 
has a feeling of fragmentation that makes it difficult to 
read. Unity is imposed on the contents in the first and 
last parts by an intellectually ambitious and abstract 
statement of a general social theory. The result is 
rather like a gigantic sandwich containing a variety of 
succulent ingredients held together by a less appealing 
outer casting (p. 197, emphasis added). 
One can hardly imagine a better description ofTwining's own 
work. Though not gigantic in length, 34 the book can be accurately 
described as an analytic sandwich. Of the . nine chapters, only the 
book's first and last (introduction and epilogue) provide the inevitable 
"intellectually ambitious" :framework of general jurisprudence in the 
new era. Together with the penultimate chapter, a book review of 
Santos' s work, they consist of the only chapters yet to be published. 
The other chapters are lectures previously delivered over the past 
decade and set in chronological order. While most repeat and re­
emphasize the need for the revival of general jurisprudence in the age 
of globalization, all fall short of elaborating on what precisely such a 
theory would entail. At times, it feels as if the author has made a 
vigorous attempt to persuade his audience of such a need, but by the 
time he succeeded he had to move on to the next chapter, starting 
from square one again. (Another feature of the lamplighter's tragedy, 
perhaps.) 
Twining opens his book with a short description ofhis project. 
"It seemed that the time was ripe for a revival of a more general 
jurisprudence. However, what this might involve was far from clear. 
It seemed a daunting task. So I decided to begin with a series of 
preliminary forays, starting with that part of our heritage of juristic 
ideas with which I was most familiar, viz. Anglo-American 
33. See supra note 13. 
34. The book holds a very tightly written 260 pages, compared to Santos's "gigantic 
sandwich," which holds 519 pages (p. 197 n.7). 
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jurisprudence from 1750 to the present day'' (pp. 3-4). This concise 
passage, as later ones may reveal, consists of both the pros and the 
cons of the entire work. While there are few who are as closely 
familiar with the canonical Anglo-American jurisprudential writings 
of the last three centuries as Professor Twining, it is not clear why it 
is there that one should begin her search for the underpinnings of a 
new jurisprudence. It is perfectly conceivable to look first at the 
nature and characteristics of the new process and then to look for an 
appropriate jurisprudence, rather than to define a process by past 
jurisprudence. Moreover, as I have already indicated, the question of 
what this general jurisprudence might actually involve remains far 
from clear by the end ofTwining' s book. With that said, this work is 
still a provocative thought-experiment in adjusting old-school theories 
to a new-school world. 
A. Defining Globalization 
Twining begins his discussion by presenting his notion of 
globalization. He states, "We are now living in a global 
neighborhood, which is not yet a global village."35 Next comes the 
definition of globalization, a mission some commentators have given 
up on due to the catch-all nature of the term.36 It is thus one of the 
book's virtues to present a short, clear, and, in my mind, very sound 
35. P. 40. To me, the image of a "global village" never captured the true image of 
globalization. Take the Internet for example, one of the signatory icons of the age. The size 
of its community is enormous. A recent Nielsen/NetRating study estimated that in November 
2000 the "Internet universe" (number ofpeople with Internet access) consisted ofa little over 
315,747,000 people. More than half of these are active Internet users. See http:// 
www.eratings.com/news at Table 2: Average Usage, At-Home, November 2000. This 
diverse community-diverse in almost every respect-uses a mammoth web of roads and 
often-clogged highways, often without knowing of or sharing with each other. These are 
hardly characteristics ofa typical village, but rather those ofa huge city, cyber Gotham ifyou 
will. And while one may sympathize with the romantic hue attached to the village image, "a 
global metropolis" seems to depict the new community in a much sounder way. Cj SASSKJA 
SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991) (describing New York, London, and Tokyo as 
multinational, multicultural social structures). 
36. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, 1999-2000 Supreme Court Review: Globalization and 
Federalism in a Post-Prinz World, 36 TuLSA L.J. 11, 11 n.I (2000) ("Defining globalization 
is notoriously difficult. As one commentator observes, the word is often 'a simple catalogue 
of everything that seems different since, say, 1970, whether advances in information 
technology, widespread use of air freight, speculation in currencies, increased capital flow 
across borders, Disneyfication of culture, mass marketing, global warming, genetic 
engineering, multinational corporate power, new international division of labor, international 
mobility of labor, reduced power of nation-states, postmodernism or post-Fordism.' Peter 
Marcuse, The Language ofGlobalization, MONTHLY REVIEW, July-Aug. 2000 at 23. I think 
[states Tushnet,] the term helpful nonetheless, and do not attempt a precise definition here."). 
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definition of the term. '"Globalization' refers to those processes 
which tend to create and consolidate a unified world economy, a 
single ecological system, and a complex network of communications 
that covers the whole globe, even if it does not penetrate every part of 
it."37 With that, Twining goes on immediately to explain that 
globalization does not imply homogenization38 and that "the global 
does not exclude the local, but rather they interact in very complex, 
sometimes contradictory ways" (p. 5). The tensions between the 
global and the local on the one hand, and between general and 
particular jurisprudence on the other, are thus presented as inevitable 
by-products of the trend towards globalization. As we shall see in 
Part N, however, Twining stops short of developing the idea that the 
factors behind globalization-the global economy, the world 
ecosystem, and new means of communication-could serve as the 
main principles upon which the new jurisprudence will be built. 
Rather, he focuses on the historical and analytical aspects of the term 
general jurisprudence. 
B. Defining Legal Theory 
After concluding that globalization "seemingly offers 
fundamental challenges to contemporary legal theory'' (p. 10), 
Twining moves on to consider the nature and role of jurisprudence 
itself. Here, obviously on very familiar grounds, he offers a very rich 
and distinctive account of the role and nature of jurisprudence within 
the discipline of law.39 Twining begins with the familiar, the 
theoretical and historical aspects of jurisprudence, which entails 
37. P. 4. To be sure, Twining's discussion of the term and its possible implications
stretches over seven pages (pp. 4-10). This presentation of the argument is thus necessarily
simplified. 
38. See also p. 89. 
39. Pp. 11-13. Such an account is hardly paralleled by American introductory literature 
on the subject. Since Karl Llewellyn's observation that "Jurisprudence is as big as law-and 
bigger," (in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 372 (1962)), most American 
commentators are less interested in evaluating the term itself. Rather, they begin their 
discussion either by considering, like Hart, what is "law" (see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, 
Introduction, in THE PIIlLOSOPHY OF LAW 1-9 (1977); GEORGE CHRISTIE & PATRICK MARTIN,
JURISPRUDENCE 1-11 (2d ed. 1995)) or by providing an historical perspective of the 
prevailing trends (see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 4-23 (1990)). Perhaps the reason for that lies, as Posner suggests, in the absence of an established 
meaning to the term (Id., at 2, n.2, citing R. Tur, What Is Jurisprudence?, 28 PHIL. Q. 149 (1978)). Hence, Posner states, "I use the word to mean the set of issues in or about law that 
philosophy can illuminate." Id. 
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synthesizing, analyzing, and simplifying functions.40 He augments 
this account by pointing to some additional features of legal theory, 
which may have some exciting implications for global jurisprudence 
(but unfortunately are not further discussed). Consider the 
relationships between law and other disciplines. Since legal-theory 
discourse is often characterized by a high level of abstraction, it may 
serve a cross-disciplinary function. The example Twining provides­
theories of justice as being a concern of lawyers, economists, and 
political theorists-brings the point home well. But one may take the 
argument a step further. By using its bridge-over-troubled-disciplines 
function, legal theory could place global phenomena such as world 
economic markets, the trend towards democratization, and global 
warming within the legal discourse. One result of that might be the 
consideration of the "law-and" theories as primary candidat~s for 
shaping the new jurisprudence. Second, jurisprudence is involved "in 
the construction of working theories for participants (for example, 
prescriptive theories of legislation, adjudication, mediation, or 
advocacy)" (p. 12). Here, again, one can think of some exciting 
global legal implications.41 Finally, legal theory may help in the 
development of"legal technology-that is the invention or creation of 
concepts, devices, institutions, and procedures as solutions to 
practical problems" (id). New times call for new measures, and a 
global jurisprudence most emphatically should be creative in that 
respect. 
40. P. 11 ("Theory can perform a variety of functions. By standing back one can 
survey the field, or some sector of it, as a whole and see how different parts are related to 
each other: one might call this the mapping or synthesizing :function. Theorizing can help us 
to construct and clarify conceptual frameworks, models, ideal types, and other thinking 
tools-this might be called the conceptual or analytical function. Constructing general 
concepts, principles, taxonomies and hypotheses can also save repetition and by 
economizing-one might call it the simplifying function."). 
41. One such implication might be a theory on Kant's vision of a "cosmopolitan 
constitution." See Jeremy Waldron, What Is Cosmopolitan? in PHILOSOPHICAL DESIGNS FOR 
ASOCIO-CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION 841, 842-43 (Tetsuji Yamamoto ed. 1998) (discussing 
Emanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: 'This May Be Trne in Theory, But It Does Not Apply 
in Practice,' in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 90 (Hans Reis ed. 1991)). As Twining 
clarifies, however, such a vision didn't entail an approval of one world government. See 
p. 73 n.4 ("[Kant rejected] a centralized regime of world government on the grounds that it 
would either be a global despotism or else an unstable and fragile empire torn by civil 
strife.") In addition, one may think of constructing theories for a new generation of 
alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Ethan Katsh et al., £-Commerce, £-Disputes, and£­
Dispute Resolution: In the Shadow of "eBay Law," 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 705 
(2000). (I thank Oma Rabinovich-Einy for this reference.) 
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Next, Twining turns to present the work's prevailing 
theoretical distinction, between particular and general jurisprudence. 
Particular jurisprudence focuses on the general aspects 
of a single legal system or order or it~ constituent 
phenomena, for example, American constitutional 
theory or the basic concepts of English law. General 
jurisprudence focuses on legal phenomena in more 
than one jurisdiction-Le. several, many, or all legal 
system or orders. 42 
General, however, is a relative term. It may be practically local, as in 
two or more legal systems within one jurisdiction; but 
characteristically general jurisprudence avails itself of much broader 
concepts such as the common law world or universal natural law. 
The most interesting applications of general jurisprudence, as already 
observed, are revealed in the intermediate levels between the two 
extremes of locality and universality. 
C. 	 Defining the Task: General Jurisprudence in the Age of 
Globalization 
Once all the pieces of the puzzle are introduced, it is time to 
define the task. As we saw earlier, a central claim made by this work 
is that "in this era of globalization there is a pressing need for a 
revival of general jurisprudence." But why? What is the reason for 
such a pressing need? Although Twining does not suggest a direct 
explanation for that question, the structure of his entire work 
provides, I believe, a powerful justification. An understanding of the 
need for general jurisprudence can be achieved by synthesizing three 
of Twining's central claims. First, the relationships between the 
global and the local in the age of globalization are intricate and 
complex. The former does not exclude the latter, and they both 
42. P. 13. Compare this argument to Anthony D'Amato's account of the distinction 
between analytical and sociological jurisprudence. ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY xi 
(Anthony D'Amato ed. 1996) ("Analytic Jurisprudence concerns the internalities of law­
what law is and how we determine what it is, whether it is consistent and by what standards 
we measure consistency. . . . In contrast, Sociological Juris-prudence . . . deals with ... 
externalities of law-how law connects to, is informed by, or derives from, social values, 
policies and norms. . . . Analytic Jurisprudence is general in conception; it applies to any 
legal system anywhere in the world. In contrast, Social Jurisprudence derives its content 
:from particular legal systems.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, most of the analytical jurists that 
D'Amato includes in his anthology-Hart, Dworkin, Kelsen, Holmes, and Llewellyn, to 
name just a few-are considered "general jurisprudence" jurists by Twining. 
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interact in many, very complicated ways. Second, compared with 
particular jurisprudence, general jurisprudence has something to say 
about more than one legal system. Third, compared with global 
jurisprudence, general jurisprudence is sensitive enough to deal with 
all the intermediate levels between the particular and the global, 
including the global level itself. Hence the need for general 
jurisprudence. On the one hand such a theory may challenge 
parochial, "black-box" (self-contained) theories.43 On the other, it 
may entail "an adequate consideration of a variety of intermediate 
stages" (p. 249), thereby rejecting "simplistic assumptions and narrow 
reductionist perspectives" (p. 247) which are presented by global 
theories. 
By now, the reader may be convinced of the need for 
developing a general jurisprudence. In particular, such a need exists 
since "much of twentieth century Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
been either quite local or else intermediate" (p. 249). But what 
exactly does such a task entail? What are the main tenets of the new 
jurisprudence? What are its main claims? What is its relation to 
other current trends in legal thought? Somewhat surprisingly, the 
book does not tackle these questions directly. Rather, it provides a 
less-than-full account of some of the key elements of the new 
jurisprudence.44 Here are some of these points. First, it is useful to 
clarify what general jurisprudence is not. It does not involve "any 
necessary commitment to particular positions on universality, cultural 
or legal relativism, or the scope from developing a global meta­
language, or empirical generalizations about legal phenomena. Such 
issues are all contested" (p. 254). One may wonder why the new 
jurisprudence refrains from taking a stand on contested issues (is not 
that one of the tasks of legal theory?), but we can hold that question 
for the moment. Second, the central question for general 
jurisprudence should be, as Twining puts it, "how far is it feasible and 
desirable to generalize about law, conceptually, normatively, 
historically, empirically, etc., across jurisdictions, national 
boundaries, traditions, and cultures?" (id). But surely that question 
does not take us much further, at least without proper guidelines for 
evaluation. Moreover, it seems that prior to dealing with the question 
· 43. The notion of "black-box" theories is discussed at length in several parts of the 
book. See generally chapter 2 (General and Particular Jurisprudence: Three Chapters in a 
Story). As examples of theories that were "exclusively American in focus, sources and 
cultural assumptions," Twining mentions the Critical Legal Studies and the Economic 
Analysis·ofLaw as they existed in the early 1990s (p. 58). 
44. A summary of these points is presented in the Epilogue (pp. 254-55), from which 
the following analysis is taken. 
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of "how far," one has to deal adequately with the question of "how." 
In other words, what are the main features of the theory's basic 
framework? Third, Twining suggests developing "an adequate 
conceptual framework and a meta-language that can transcend 
particular legal cultures" (p. 89). What would such a framework 
entail? At first stage it will include "fundamental legal concepts such 
as rule, obligation, rights and sanction." But in addition to these by­
now-familiar terms, the new jurisprudence will contain an account of 
concepts "of historical, anthropological, sociological, or political 
jurisprudence" (p. 255). Moreover, in addition to its conceptual­
elucidation aspect, the new jurisprudence will include "issues 
concerning form and structure, reasoning and rationality, and many 
other issues shared with rational philosophy'' (id.). 
To be sure, this account of the new jurisprudence is indeed 
food for thought. The need to incorporate new concepts as well as to 
introduce new ideas about form and structure, into the new theory 
seem theoretically and pragmatically sound. With that, I must admit 
that its high level of abstraction makes it almost impossible to refute. 
Who could (or would) seriously contest a proposal to include new, 
more comprehensive, and up-to-date concepts into legal theory? Who 
can argue with the need to deal with "issues concerning form and 
structure" in the new world-order? Indeed, one might have expected 
a more controversial account of the image of the next general 
jurisprudence. And while Professor Twining rightly deserves to be 
commended for his important call to promote (and revive) general 
jurisprudence, most readers might have expected to learn more about 
its nature. 
If the book's main task is not to portray in detail the image of 
a new theory, what is it? The principal body of this work consists of 
three parts. First, a historical, analytical, and critical survey of 
general jurisprudence as seen by the great Anglo-American jurists of 
the past three centuries. Second, the study of comparative law and its 
possible implications to a new legal theory. Finally, a detailed 
comparison between this project and a previous, post-modem work by 
Santos. I will discuss each of those in tum. 
D. The Canonical Jurists and General Jurisprudence 
Chapters 2-5 are dedicated to a survey of the great Anglo­
American jurists and their relations to the notion of general 
jurisprudence. All the familiar analytical figures are here-from 
Bentham and Austin to Holmes and Kelsen; from Llewellyn and 
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Rawls to Hart and Dworkin-all had something substantial to say 
about general jurisprudence. Twining' s conclusion from this survey 
is positive: "On the whole, they are more relevant than might at first 
be apparent" (p. 250). Indeed, Twining centers his entire intellectual 
effort on demonstrating the added value these great thinkers 
contribute to the discussion. And yet, despite-and maybe because 
of-the intensity of this effort Twining leaves his reader with a sense 
of uneasiness. Apart from Rawls and Dworkin, not one of the 
distinguished members of the group has lived to witness the process 
of globalization. Not one of the works cited has been written against 
a factual background that includes the Internet, CNN, or global 
inarkets-to name just a few signatory signs of the time. And while 
some have used relevant terms, such as "citizen of the world" by 
Bentham, for example, one wonders if that fact alone entitles them to 
participate in the debate of the shape of the new jurisprudence. A 
relevant question in this context is whether there is any connection 
between the "world" Bentham saw (or even envisioned) in the late 
eighteenth century and the world as it is today-be it a global village, 
neighbor4ood or, better yet, a metropolis. In short, why should 
globalization jurisprudence be ruled from the grave by people who 
could not know, even if they would have really desired to, the first 
thing about globalization? 
At this stage the American reader may encounter a vague 
sense of deja-vu. The debate on whether the writings of old jurists 
should dictate the meaning of currently used notions sounds all too 
familiar. One of the most vehement arguments in American 
constitutional theory today revolves precisely around such issues.45 
In a way, however, Twining is turning the originalist argument on its 
head, by trying to argue in favor of an "original" understanding of a 
"text" that is yet to be written.46 Twining would probably argue in 
45. The body of literature on the debate between originalists and non-originalists is 
enormous. See, e.g., .ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (Amy Gutman ed. 
1997) ("But the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is ... between 
original meaning (whether derived from Framers' intent or not) and current meaning.") 
(originalist); CHARLES L. BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 15 (1997) ("Some people, faced 
with this question [of constitutional interpretation], would try to dig up every scrap of paper 
that happens to have survived since the eighteenth century; and to piece together some·sort of 
'intent,' with very little weight given to the transcendently relevant piece ofpaper, on which 
the duly enacted text ofNinth Amendment was written.") (anti-originalist). 
46. Even Justice Scalia agrees that the "original meaning" of a text relates to the 
meaning at the time ofits drafting. SCALIA, supra note 45, at 38. In the case before us, then, 
a "fusion of horizons" (see HANS GEORGE GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 306-07 
(Weinsheimer & Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1994) occurs: the time-of-the-drafting and the 
current are one. As a result, even a committed originalist would hesitate to go back in time in 
order to discern authoritatively the meaning ofthe term. 
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response that since the term "general jurisprudence" has already been 
discussed in academic circles for more than two hundred years, there 
is no good reason to ignore such a vast body of scholarship. While 
powerful, I think this answer misses an important point. The issue is 
not whether one may consult the old jurists on the correct 
interpretation of general jurisprudence. Rather, it is whether one can 
consult them on the issue of general jurisprudence in the age of 
globalization. The question is one ·of context. To be sure, in 
constructing the contextual meaning of the term global jurisprudence 
one is welcome to consult great past jurists and their thoughts on the 
contextual meaning of the term. Indeed, such a dialogue between 
different accounts of the term through time may yield a reflective 
interpretive equilibrium.47 Nonetheless, it is obvious that the weight 
of the input of past jurists to notions such as global markets,· the 
Internet, and international corporations is limited. Therefore, their 
total impact in shaping the current, contextual meaning of the term 
should not be over emphasized. 
I have walked a considerable length in trying to show that 
turning to past writers as an exclusive source of learning on general 
jurisprudence in the age of globalization is not sufficient. But such an 
argument calls, in tum, for the introduction of a different account of 
general jurisprudence. I will suggest an outline for such an account in 
Part N. To be sure, my account will also be based, in part, on past 
writings. We can only see afar because we are standing on the 
shoulders of our predecessors. And yet, I argue that the writings we 
should rely upon do not merely respond to the "general" aspect of the 
new jurisprudence; rather, they respond to it being the age of 
globalization. 
It is time to return to Twining' s account of the great jurists. 
Here Twining walks calmly along the familiar paths of his 
jurisprudential garden. The accounts in this part are extremely 
knowledgeable, detailed, and, once set in their proper context, very 
helpful to understanding the concept of general jurisprudence. A few 
short comments are still in order. First, readers who expect to find a 
general introduction to the writings of each of the great thinkers might 
be disappointed. For example, the discussion of Hart's account does 
not explain what Primary and Secondary Rules are, or the meaning of 
the Rule of Recognition.48 The exposition of Bentham's account, 
47. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971). 
48. For a useful introduction see BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 
31-49 {2d ed. 1999). See generally NEIL McCORMICK, H.L.A. HART {1983); MICHAEL 
BAYLES, HART'S LEGAL PIDLOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION (1992). 
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though very extensive (pp. 91-107), does not include his definition of 
utility, or an explanation of why non-legal rights are, in his opinion, 
"nonsense upon stilts."49 Rawls' account (pp. 69-75) does not deal 
with the "veil of ignorance," and so on. One possible explanation for 
these omissions is that the discussions are intentionally designed to 
have one focal point-they deal only with the aspect of the theories 
that may have a direct bearing to general jurisprudence. so Another 
more likely explanation is that these chapters were previously 
delivered, and published, as public lectures for professional 
audiences, thereby without need or time for such introductory 
remarks. However, since this book is aimed at a much ·wider 
audience than the lectures, one may hope that these gaps will be filled 
in future editions. 
How did Twining select the dramatis personae of his book? 
Is the collection of analytical positivists, realists, liberalists, and neo­
naturalists merely arbitrary? Or is it Twining's view of a systematic 
historical account of Anglo-American legal thought? Before we 
approach Twining's answer, one must bear in mind a warning made 
by the renowned English historian, Edward Carr, of the subjective and 
ever time-dependent nature of historical accounts. 51 But Twining 
evidently did not pick up a random list of famous writers. Instead, he 
relies on a recent academic survey which determined the eight 
representatives of the current canon m taught jurisprudence in 
England, Australia, and common law universities in Canada. 52 These 
eight figures-Hart, Dworkin, Rawls, Finnis, Austin, Bentham, 
Kelsen, and Llewellyn-are the basis of his historically analytical 
survey. As I indicated earlier, Twining does a very impressive job in 
tying the legal theory of each to the concept of general jurisprudence. 
To be sure, there are others who may have contributed to the 
49. P. 106. For such an explanation, see Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM 77-105 (1983) 
(setting the famous saying against the background ofthe French declaration ofrights). 
50. Though this is a possible explanation, one can judge a legal theory against a single 
argument and still provide an excellent account of its main themes. For a sound 
demonstration see DANNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 59-128 (1996) (reviewing the 
theories of Hart, Dworkin, and Fish in light of a single question-what does it mean to say 
that a proposition oflaw is truth). 
51. EDWARD H. CARR, WHAT Is HISTORY? 24, 28 (1961) ("In the first place, the facts of 
history never come to us "pure," since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form: they are 
always refracted through the mind ofthe recorder .... The third point is that we can view the 
past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The 
historian is ofhis own age, and is bound to it by the conditions ofhuman existence."). 
52. Hilaire Barnett, The Province ofJurispntdence Detennined-Again!, 15 LEG, STUD. 
88 (1995), cited on p. 57, n.3. Though the survey did not include American schools, it would 
be fair to say that these prominent thinkers play a central role in most introductory 
jurisprudential texts published here. 
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discussion on general jurisprudence no less, and possibly even more 
than the commentators Twining discusses. Lon Fuller's idea of the 
internal morality oflaw53 and Leslie Howfeld's remarkable analytical 
framework ofrights54 are merely two examples that come to mind.55 
But this is anecdotal; the point that Twining is trying to deliver­
about the relevance of past thinkers to the notion of general 
jurisprudence-is well taken. 56 
E. A Special Case: Comparative Law and General Jurisprudence 
After introducing the views of the main canonical jurists vis-a­
vis general jurisprudence, Twining moves on to examine "the 
prevailing assumptions underpinning work in specialized sub­
disciplines that contain a strong transnational element" (p. 251), 
namely comparative law. At the outset, Twining warns us that "I do 
not consider myself to be a comparatist." But the two chapters to 
follow are full of indications to the contrary. Twining demonstrates 
deep familiarity with most of the relevant literature on both sides of 
the Atlantic. He accurately presents the current prevailing notions 
and then suggests the logical implications for general jurisprudence. 
Chapter 6, Mapping Law, deals primarily with Twining's 
bold, but ultimately futile, attempt to map the entire world's legal 
terrain. The experiment took place in three different continents 
(Africa, Europe, and America) and over almost forty years (1958­
1996). But more than the report on the experiment itself, it is helpful 
to read Twining's post-mortem account of the reasons for its failure. 
Though his analysis is very thorough and detailed, it can be fairly 
reduced to a single sentence: "the phenomena of law are probably too 
complex to be depicted on a single map or picture" (p. 151). Indeed, 
the main theme of the chapter is that "describing a legal order is 
rather like describing a city in that both are highly complex 
phenomena that can be depicted in many different ways from a great 
variety of vantage points and perspectives" (p. 212). To demonstrate 
53. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91(rev. ed. 1969). 
54. Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALEL.J. (1913). 
55. It should be stated, in all fairness, that Twining is very familiar with both of these 
works and that the two scholars are mentioned more than once in this book. 
56. As I have indicated earlier, it is my belief that this discussion is not contextual, in 
that is it disregards the globalization factor ofthe term. 
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this point, Twining draws heavily on Italo Calvino's Invisible 
Cities.57 
However, this attempt to map, particularly in the age of 
globalization, may be futile for another important reason. Mapping 
presupposes the fixed nature of its subject. Ifby the time the map is 
made the terrain (be it physical, mental or cyber) has undergone a 
transformation, the map would no longer be of value.58 As we have 
seen, globalization is defined, first and foremost, as a process. 59 By 
its nature, every process is transient. In the case of globalization in 
particular, as Twining himself acknowledged, the process involves 
"the rapidity of changes" (p. 223). Journalist Thomas Friedman 
captured this point well by writing that with globalization, we are not 
only dealing with "a dynamic ongoing process" but rather with one 
that has a "defining measurement of . . . speed-speed of commerce, 
travel, communication and innovation."60 And while it may be 
persuasively argued that every theory, legal theories included, should 
not render itself obsolete with every variation of circumstances, it is 
also true that a· theory that is intended to serve such a transitory 
process may simply not be well suited for the challenge ofmapping. 
From geographical or physical mapping Twining advances to 
mental mapping. Here he addresses issues like global statistics, 
ranking of legal systems in general and the rankings of law schools, 
primarily the ranking conducted by the US News and World Report. I 
found his remarks on the nature of comparison extremely 
illuminating.61 
57. ITALO CALVINO, lNvISIBLE CITIES (William Weaver trans., Hardcort Brace & 
Company 1974). Later Twining suggests to add this book, "in which Marco Polo gives 55 
highly imaginative accounts of55 different cities, or 55 accounts ofone city, Venice, or more 
plausibly, 55 accounts all of which implicitly use Venice as the reference points of 
comparison" (p. 212), to our juristic cannon (p. 254). 
58. The Little Prince can again be ofhelp, this time from the planet ofthe geographer: 
"We do not record flowers," said the geographer. "Why is that?" (asked the 
little prince.) "We do not record them," said the geographer, "because they are 
ephemeral." "What does that mean-ephemeral?" "Geographies ... are books 
which of all books are most concerned with matters of consequence. They 
never become old-fashioned. It is very rarely that a mountain changes its 
position. It is very rarely that an ocean empties itself of its waters. We write on 
eternal things." 
ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPERY, supra note 1, at 53-54 (emphasis added). 
59. See supra note 37 and the text accompanying. 
60. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 9-10 (expanded ed., 
Anchor Books, 2000). 
61. For example, on page 164, we find that "We use comparators not only to compare 
two or more objects, but also to describe individual phenomena." 
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Chapter 7 deals with globalization and comparative law. 62 
One of the working premises Twining advances here is that today, 
"nearly all legal studies are cosmopolitan in that legal scholars, law 
students and many professional actors regularly have to use sources, 
materials and ideas developed in more than one jurisdiction and in 
more than one legal culture" (p. 255). Is that claim valid for 
American legal studies? As long as one considers the United States­
F ederal and State legal systems combined-as one jurisdiction or 
legal culture,63 the assertion could be vehe~ently contested. 
American commentators have strongly emphasized the parochial 
nature of the American legal discourse. 64 Elsewhere in the book, 
Twining himself attests to that phenomenon,. arguing that "much 
American writing cites only or mainly or almost exclusively 
American sources even when dealing with issues that are not merely 
local" (p. 128). It seems, then, that either American legal studies are 
not yet cosmopolitan, or that the United States should be considered 
as a micro-cosmos of its own. 65 In any event, while the validity of 
the claim as positive law can be contested, it seems that most will 
agree on it as being a worthy cause. 
62. See also Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of 
Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 221, 223-24 (1999) ("This moment of fascination with 
things global, and the demands that this creates in all aspects· of legal scholarship and 
practice, call for a reconsideration of the rules. This would seem to be prectsely the task of 
comparative law-hence the renewed interest in the field. Comparative legal scholarship is 
thought to be sorely needed both as a tool for solving the new problems of globalization and 
because it seems to be the key to a wider understanding of global, transnational, or cross­
cultural legal phenomena. Indeed, comparativists have been quick to embrace this somewhat 
amorphous but powerful rationale for their projects.") (footnotes omitted). 
63. But see p. 128 ("is there one American legal culture that encompasses California, 
Boston and Cripple Creek Colorado?"). 
64. See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 683, 690 (1998) ("The striking feature of American jurisprudential debate is its 
provinciality. The arguments go forward as though we are the only legal system in the world. 
The world may be getting smaller. Investment brokers are now as familiar with the Asian 
markets as they are with the NASDAQ. But despite the cant about globalization and global 
law programs, we teach law much the same way as we have since the time ofLangdell."); see 
also Ackerman, supra note 2, at 772-73 ("But the global transformation has not yet had the 
slightest impact on American constitutional thought. The typical American judge would not 
think of learning from an opinion by the German or French constitutional court. Nor would 
the typical scholar-assuming, contrary to fact, that she could follow the natives' reasoning 
in their alien tongues.") (footnotes omitted). Twining himself laments on the parochial 
nature oflegal theory in America. Seep. 58 ("[American jurisprudential movements of the 
last two decades] are almost exclusively American in focus, ·sources and cultural 
assumption."). 
65. Although it seems that the latter option falls under Twining's definition of legal 
pluralism. See pp. 82-88. 
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The other main points of this chaEter, all sound in my mind, 
can be summarized in the following way. 6 First, a (by now familiar) 
distinction should be drawn between parochial or local and 
cosmopolitan legal studies. While parochial studies tend to look at 
one legal system, cosmopolitan legal studies involve a substantial 
cross-jurisdictional or foreign dimension. Today, few legal scholars 
can afford to be strongly parochial, in particular with respect to their 
focus or sources.67 Second, most legal systems today share the 
concepts of legal pluralism, 68 multiple levels of ordering,69 and 
integrality. A major contributing factor for that development is the 
collapse of the notion of a "black-box" community, a self-contained, 
completely autonomous social unit. As a result, even a rudimentary 
description of these legal systems necessarily involves at least an 
implicit comparison. "In a loose sense, we are all comparativists 
now" (p. 255). Third, in order to prepare legal students for the 
cosmopolitan age, comparative methods should be introduced into 
every legal program. With that, because we are still in a stage of 
transition, the motto should be, "think global, focus local" (p. 256). 
Fourth, there is room for more specialist scholars, associations, 
journals, courses, and projects on comparative law. Due to the 
growth of the discipline, it requires more than ever the insights, 
knowledge, and skills that such specialized forms of learning can 
bring. Fifth, though the practice of comparative law has been 
substantially developed in recent years, the theoretical aspect of the 
field has not followed suit. As a result, there is a tendency to shy 
away from addressing difficult theoretical questions concerning 
comparability, comparative method, the construction of usable cross­
cultural concepts, generalization, and so on. A related point, sixth, is 
that institutionalized comparative law has tended to be marginalized 
66. Pp. 174-93. Twining himself summarizes this chapter on pp. 255-56. My analysis 
here relies to a great extent on this summary. 
67. By "focus" Twining means the theocy's issues. "Afocus is strongly parochial ifit 
is limited to local parish pump issues" (p. 128). By "sources" he means the origin of the 
references used. "Juristic writing may be local or parochial in respect of sources. For 
example, much American writing cites only or mainly or almost exclusively American 
sources, even when dealing with issues that are not merely local." Id. 
68. That is, they have more than one set of orders co-existing in a single geographic 
space. The concept is discussed on pp. 82-88. As an example to a pluralist legal system the 
author brings Tanzania in the 1960s. The legal system there involved "local legislation, 
Islamic, Hindu, and 'customary' law. English common law and 'statutes of general 
application' served as a residual law under a standard 'reception clause.' All of these bodies 
of law were recognized by the state and some formed part of a single national legal system" 
(p. 83). 
69. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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in academic circles.7 ° Few modern canonical jurists have paid much 
sustained attention to comparative law and its theoretical problems 
(p. 177). As a result, comparative law tended to be quite isolated 
from mainstream legal theory. However, comparative law and legal 
theory are interdependent. Foreign and comparative legal studies 
provide much of the raw material for developing a new general 
jurisprudence. 
The penultimate chapter, Globalization, Post-modernism and 
Pluralism, serves in two capacities. First, it introduces at considerable 
length Santos's post-modernist work on globalization and legal 
theory.71 This is Twining's "textbook" for the seminar on 
globalization (p. 257). Two other post-modern works that are 
considered are Susan Haak\~roject on "innocent realism"72 and Italo 
Calvino's Invisible Cities. Second, it juxtaposes Twining's 
conservative account74 with some unorthodox post-modernist 
arguments. Apart from the inevitable jargon, Twining is doing an 
exceptional job here in elucidating some of the most complex 
concepts of legal post-modernism.75 On the other hand, at times the 
two accounts-conservative and post-modem-seem to stand so far 
apart, speak in such different terms and address so many different 
issues that it is very har~ if not impossible, to create a meaningful 
dialogue between them. 7 Even the point that comes across most 
clearly-the different kinds of predictions the works are willing to 
70. Cf Fletcher, supra note 64, at 690-95 (suggesting a detailed account of the reasons 
for the failure of comparative law as an academic discipline both in the US and in other 
countries.); Riles, supra note 62, at 224 ("For decades, comparativists have watched interest 
in their scholarship wane to the point that one of the principal preoccupations of the field has 
become how to convince "mainstream" legal scholars ofthe value of their enterprise."). 
71. SANTOS, supra note 13. 
72. SUSAN HAAK, MANIFESTO OF APASSIONATE MODERATE (1998). 
73. CALVINO, supra note 57. 
74. P. 195 ("The argument was essentially conservative in that it suggested that there is 
much in our heritage of canonical texts that is worth preserving and using in this changing 
situation."). 
75. For example, Twining distinguishes between imaginative and irrationalist post­
modernism. The former "emphasizes the elusiveness of reality, the fallibility ofwhat passes 
for established knowledge, the importance of attending to multiple perspectives and points of 
view, a resistance to closure, and a playful style that treats metaphor and imagination as 
necessary to understanding complex phenomena;" the latter "seems to involve commitment 
to strong versions of cultural relativism, epistemological skepticism, anti-rationalism and 
irrealism" (p. 196). While embracing, within certain limits, the idea of imaginative post­
modemism, Twining rejects the notions presented by irrationalist post-modernism. 
76. See, e.g., p. 203 ("Some readers may dismiss this part of Toward a New Common 
Sense as incomprehensible. I personally find the metaphors intriguing, but frustratingly 
vague.... I read these chapters (and Santos's subsequent address) with enjoyment and 
skepticism in equal measure."). 
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make-does not contribute much to the understanding of Twining' s 
project.77 In short, while the chapter can be seen as an invaluable 
source for the understanding of otherwise inaccessible texts, it 
contributes little to the understanding ofTwining's own project. 
The last chapter, Chapter 9, Epilogue, succinctly summarizes 
the entire project. It is followed by an appendix that introduces the 
seminar Twining gives on globalization and law, including a list of 
the suggested readings. 
Ill. 	 HART, DWORKIN, AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: THREE 
VIEWS OF THE CATHEDRAL? 
A. 	 Three Different Views 
In the previous part we saw the distinction between general 
and particular jurisprudence. Historically, by the late-eighteenth 
century and for most of the nineteenth century, English jurisprudence 
was assumed to be general, primarily due to the writings of Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832), a "citizen of the world,"78 and his disciple 
John Austin (1790-1859).79 In the late-nineteenth century the trend 
shifted, as British law schools began to move towards particular 
jurisprudence, primarily due to practical considerations of the 
curriculum. This trend continued until 1961, when H.L.A. Hart 
revived general jurisprudence in the first edition of his Concept of 
Law (pp. 25-35, 249). But it was not until 1992, in his posthumously 
published Postscript to the second edition, that Hart used the 
distinction in a substantial mode.80 Here, the term general 
77. P. 223 {"The main difference between Santos's and my interpretatiqns of 
globalization seems to be largely one of time scale. He readily concedes that in the medium 
and the short term the nation state is likely to remain by far the most significant actor at 
nearly all levels and what he calls 'counter-hegemonic forces' are currently underdevdoped 
and weak. Conversely, given the rapidity ofchange and the complexity of the processes, I do 
not feel capable ofmaking confident predictions about the longer term. Where he is utopian 
and optimistic, I am agnostic and rather more pessimistic."). 
78. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 397-98 (J.H. Burns & E.L.A. 
Hart eds. 1977), cited at p. 16 n.2. 
79. Pp. 15-24. 
80. Pp. 35-38, 249. Twining contends that Hart drew no sharp distinction between 
general and particular jurisprudence in the first edition to his book, and that even his later 
works "on causation, intention, responsibility and rights could reasonably be interpreted as 
contributions to particular jurisprudence." (p. 35). I beg to differ with this assertion as long 
as it relates to Hart's classic (co-authored with A. M. HONORE) on CAUSATION IN THE LAW 
{2d ed. 1985). This work is considered by many to be a classic demonstration of the 
application ofmethods ofanalytic philosophy-general analytical philosophy-to law. 
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jurisprudence was invoked as a basis for comparison between Hart's 
own work and Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire.81 The two 
enterprises, Hart contended, were "radically different." While his was 
general "in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal system 
or legal culture," Dworkin's was '"addressed to a particular legal 
culture,'82 which is usually the theorist's own and in Dworkin's case 
is that of Anglo-American law."83 For this and other reasons, Hart 
could not see the logic in comparing the two works. 84 
Hart's account-depicting his own work as general while 
Dworkin's as particular-is compellingly challenged by Twining. 
While agreeing with Hart that his own work "is clearly in the tradition 
of general jurisprudence," Twining describes Hart's particularistic 
account of Dworkin as "absurd" (p. 38). First, he argues that the idea 
that interpretation of a social practice involves "showing it in its best 
light"85 is not limited to any legal system.86 Second, Dworkin's 
account of Hercules, while he may not be "a citizen of the world," 
provides a model for judging "in any liberal democracy'' (p. 39). 
Finally, "Dworkin's criticisms of legal positivism are not confined to 
England and the United States" (p. 39). 
Still, in order to convincingly claim that Dworkin's account is 
general, Twining had to overcome yet another zealous contender­
Ronald Dworkin himself. Indeed, it was Dworkin who insisted that 
"interpretive theories are by their nature addressed to a particular 
legal culture, generally the culture to which their authors belong."87 
81. DWORKIN, EMPIRE supra note 30. In explaining his decision to focus on Dworkin's 
critique, Hart wrote that "he [Dworkin] has not only argued that nearly all the distinctive 
theses of this book are radically mistaken, but he has called in question the whole conception 
of legal theory and ofwhat it should do which is implicit in the book." HART, POSTSCRIPT, 
supra note 29, at 239. 
82. Citing DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 102. 
83. HART, POSTSCRIPT, supra note 29, at 240. 
84. Id. at 241 ("It is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant 
conflict between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin's conceptions of legal 
theory."). 
85. P. 39 (citing DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 90). 
86. P. 38. For an argument placing Dworkin's "law as integrity'' credo in even a wider 
context-that of the postmodern ''web ofknowledge'-see Michael Dorf, Truth, Justice and 
the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 137 n.17, 146-48 (1997) (reviewing 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(1996) and DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)) (convincingly showing that no 
practical differences exist between Patterson's post-modem account of "law and truth" and 
Dworkin's theory of"law as integrity."). 
87. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 102. 
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But Twining is not fazed. First, he invokes Sir T.E. Holland's88 
example ofa geologist who has studied only English strata. Does that 
make his findings "English geology"? Holland's response is 
negative: the findings could be scientific only if the generalizations 
about them "would hold good everywhere" (p. 28). Second, while 
agreeing with Dworkin that in order to be practical, 'jurisprudence 
... has to be local and particular," Twining claims that "that does not 
mean that the core elements in his theory only apply to one system" 
(p. 41). Third, and most importantly, Twining depicts Dworkin's 
account of his own theory as inaccurate. "Dworkin may have done 
himself a disservice by claiming to advance a theory of adjudication. 
What he is really advancing is a theory of correct interpretation of 
legal norms" (p. 45). Hercules is not only a symbol of a great judge. 
He also stands as a model for anyone who is interested in making 
informed decisions as to what the law prescribes, be it public 
officials, lawyers, or good citizens. Using Dworkin's own theoretical 
tools, Twining concludes, "one doubts whether labeling Dworkin's 
theory as a 'theory of adjudication' is making it the best it can be. It 
has a much wider reach than that" (p. 46). 
Twining's first argument is arguably misplaced. It seems that 
invoking Holland's geology example is to assume the very question 
being argued. Geology is different from law both in that it deals with 
natural phenomena rather than social practices and due to the 
tendency of its subjects to appear in similar forms all over the world 
(and, as we know today, on other planets as well). For example, 
when Deodat de-Dolomieu discovered a common rock-forming 
mineral in the late-eighteenth century, his fmdings were not limited to 
any particular jurisdiction. On the contrary, Dolomite rocks appeared, 
then and now, in many places around the world, and they all share the 
same characteristics. In contrast, law is a social artifact, a man-made 
phenomenon. It ap~eared in different cultures at different times in 
many distinct forms. 9 By its nature it cannot be identical, but rather, 
at most, share some common principles or conceptions. True, these 
are the same features general jurisprudence would like to reveal. But 
from here to geology there is still a considerable distance. Comparing 
law to geology, in short, simply begs the question. 
88. Sir T.E. Holland (1835-1926) was an Oxford Professor from 1874 to 1910. See 
p. 26n.9. 
89. Cf Leslie Green, Philosophy and Law: The Concept ofLaw Revisited, 94 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1687, 1687 (1996) (reviewing HART, CONCEPT) (presenting the following as one of the 
main theses of Hart's book: "Law is a social construction. It is a historically contingent 
feature ofcertain societies, one whose emergence is signaled by the rise ofa systematic form 
ofsocial control and elite domination."). 
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But let us return to Twining. As noted earlier, he agrees with 
Hart that The Concept ofLaw is of a general nature. By now, he also 
concludes that "Law's Empire advances a general theory oflaw, or at 
least of adjudication; it contains very few concrete examples of 
interpretation and those are mainly illustrative" (p. 41). And while 
agreeing that "some of Dworkin's other writings are more local," he 
argues that they "can be interpreted as application of the general 
approach."90 Thus, Twining finds both Hart's and Dworkin's works 
to be ofa general nature. 
Other commentators have examined this issue and come up 
with yet another option: both Hart and Dworkin deal with particular 
jurisprudence. Twining discusses in that respect P.S. Atiyah and 
Robert Summers, who argued in their seminal comparative work of 
England and the United States91 that Dworkin and Hart could be best 
understood as contributing to his own legal system (p. 42). In another 
coi:n:parative report, Richard Posner expresses an almost similar 
opm1on: 
The preface to The Concept ofLaw says that the reader 
is free to take the book as "an essay in descriptive 
sociology''92 and so taken, especially in contrast to 
Dworkin's writings, it is illuminating as a stylized 
description of the modem English legal system by a 
knowledgeable insider, just as Dworkin's juris­
prudence is illuminating as a stylized description of the 
methods of liberal Supreme Court Justices, and just as 
the discussion of corrective justice in the Nicomachean 
Ethics is illuminating as a stylized description of the 
Athenian legal system ofAristotle's day.93 
90. P. 41. Twining does not make a reference here to Dworkin's FREEDOM'S LAW: THE 
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), published four years prior to his 
own book, though a perfect candidate for a local application ofDworkin's general approach. 
For an elaboration ofthis argument, see Dorf, supra note 86, at 138-43. 
91. P.S ATIYAH & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO AMERICAN 
LAW(l987). 
92. HART, supra note 23, at v. 
93. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 20 (1996) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ENGLAND AND AMERICA] (lecture one: "Hart vs. Dworkin, Europe vs. 
America"). 
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B. Resolving the Puzzle? 
There are, then, at least three different accounts of Hares and 
Dworkin's enterprises. The first-Hart's own-asserts that his work 
is one of general jurisprudence, while Dworkin's is of particular 
nature. Dworkin, it seems, would agree with that analysis, at least 
with regard to his part in it. The second account, by Twining, claims 
that both works are of general jurisprudence: while Hart was right in 
portraying his work as transcending legal systems, Dworkin was too 
cautious in describing his as merely an Anglo-American adjudication 
theory. Finally, two comparative accounts of the English and 
American legal systems have argued that both works could J?e best 
seen as contributing to particular jurisprudence. 
Though at first sight these accounts seem conflicting, a closer 
look may reveal that all three are but different views of the same 
cathedral.94 In order to put those meta-theoretical evaluations in their 
proper perspective, however, one may tum to the basic distinction 
between law as a contextual phenomenon and as an abstract, 
acontextual phenomenon.95 "Law" can be seen either as an 
independent notion, divorced from its particular occurrences, or as an 
empty shell, filled with content only when "at work."96 Questions 
94. The locus classicus of all theoretical views of a cathedral is, of course, Guido 
Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1089 (1972) (an allusion to Monet's Rauen Cathedral 
series). Twining, I presume, would prefer to use Calvino's metaphor of fifty-five depictions 
of the same city. Responding to the idea of objective existence versus different appearances, 
Carr noted that "(i]t does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different 
shapes from different angles ofvision, it has objectively either no shape at all or an infinity of 
shapes." CARR, supra note 51, at 30. I will not explore here another route of reconciling all 
three accounts-that of admitting that they simply respond to different questions and thus 
serve different purposes. Twining considers such a solution. See p. 39 ("Jurisprudence is a 
wasteland of false polemics and one way of disposing of such squabbles is to show that the 
best interpretation of two apparently conflicting positions is that they provide answers to 
different questions rather than rival answers to shared questions."); see also Brx, supra note 
48, at 12 ("The short answer to [questions of conflicting theories of general jurisprudence] is 
that different theories seem to be responding to different types of inquiries and are making 
different kinds ofclaims."). 
95. This distinction, echoing the classic dichotomy between concepts and precepts, is as 
old as philosophy itself In his famous attempt to synthesize the two, Kant wrote: "[w]ithout 
sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. . . . The 
understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can 
knowledge arise." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, A 51 B/75 (N. Kemp Smith 
trans., 2d ed. 1933) (1781). 
96. See Andrei Marmor, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 35 (1992) ("The basic 
presumption underlying the analytical approach to jurisprudence is that a distinction exists 
between the abstract concept of law and its realization in particular institutions. An attempt 
to characterize the concept oflaw is basically independent ofattempts to answer questions on 
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such as "what is law?" are generally of interest to people holding the 
former view, while contextual questions, such as whether a pre­
existing debt constitutes a valid consideration,97 belong to the latter.98 
This distinction between jurisprudence at large and the study 
of "law at work"99 can provide a useful criterion for assessing 
different accounts ofa jurisprudential work. Someone who adheres to 
such a distinction would be drawn to, or at least would be willing to 
accept, the general aspects of a legal theory, those aspects which 
apply to more than one system regardless of the specific context of its 
appearance. Conversely, one who eradicates the notion of an 
independent law, one who deems acontextual law as unsound, would 
tend to emphasize the particular aspects of a legaHheory. 
Richard Posner is an outspoken representative of the "law in 
context" camp. He believes that the question "what is law?" is of no 
real value. 100 He also suggests that it is Hart's belief in the notion of 
acontextual law that created the (wrong) impre~sion of the general 
nature of his work. 101 Properly viewed, then, Hart's account should 
be put into context. Not surprisingly, Atiyah and Summers share this 
resentment for an isolated notion of law: "In our view, then, the 
primary subject matter of jurisprudence is not a single universal 
subject matter, abstracted from the variant phenomena of law in all 
societies. It should, rather, consist of relevant features of the 
what the law requires in this or that situation. 'What is the law?' and 'What is (or should be) 
the law on a given issue?' are, according to this traditional view, separate and basically 
independent questions."). 
97. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842). 
98. Note that at times, contextual questions may relate to the term "law'' as well. For 
example, if an act contains the word "Jaws" in it, such as in the Rules of Decision Act (see 
Swift, id.), the term must be interpreted; nonetheless, this interpretation will not be stripped of 
context. See POSNER, ENGLAND AND AMERICA, supra note 93, at 8-10. 
99. H.L.A Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,- in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21 {1983). 
100. POSNER, ENGLAND AND AMERICA, supra note 93, at 2-3 ('"[L]aw' is so difficult, 
maybe impossible to define acontextually. . . . I have nothing against philosophical 
speculation. But one would like it to have some pay-off; something ought to turn on the 
answer to the question 'What is law?' if the question is to be worth asking by people who 
could use their time in other socially valuable ways. Nothing does turn on it. I go further: 
the central task ofanalytic jurisprudence is, or at least ought to be, not to answer the question 
'what is law?' but to show that it should not be asked, because it only confuses matters."). 
101. Id. at 37 ("Now we know why the concept of Jaw is so elusive. Writers on 
jurisprudence [i.e., Hart] treat it as a universal topic; they decontextualize it; yet actually it is 
local. Within the context of a specific legal system, with its own settled expectations 
concerning the judicial function, it is possible to pronounce a judicial decision 'lawless' 
because it relies on considerations or materials that the local culture rules out of bound for 
judges."). 
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phenomena oflaw in one or more particular societies."102 As a result, 
both comparative accounts focus on the particular nature of the two 
works. 
On the other end we find Hart and others, such as Joseph Raz. 
They firmly believe in the existence of the concept of "law" or of 
"legal system" as such. 103 As a result, they would have no difficulties 
in delineating their own work, or that of others, as one of general 
jurisprudence.104 Recall that Twining, a student of Hart and, like 
him, an analytical positivist, agreed that "Hart's work is clearly in the 
tradition ofgeneral jurisprudence." 105 
Dworkin is the most intricate. He opens his introduction to a 
collection of essays on the philosophy of law with an illuminating 
discussion of "what is law?"106 On another occasion, while 
comparing legal positivism and natural law theories to his, he wrote: 
''Neither of the two positions fits the actual practice of lawyers and 
judges . . . the third, interpretive, view of law fits the practices of 
lawyers, jud~es, and other legal officials naturally and 
convincingly." 07 And in introducing the philosophy behind Law's 
102. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 418. 
103. See JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF ALEGAL SYSTEM I (2d ed. 1980) ("This work is 
an introduction to general study of legal systems. . . . A comprehensive investigation may 
result in what could be called a theory of legal system. Such a theory is general in that it 
claims to be true of all legal systems. If it is successful it elucidates the concept of a legal 
system, and forms a part ofgeneral analytic jurisprudence."). 
104. Hart in fact opens his famous book with a discussion of"What is law?" However, 
Richard Fallon is right by pointing out that less than "the law" as such, Hart discusses the 
context in which the question is likely to arise: that of a legal system. Richard Fallon, 
Reflections on Dworkin and Two Faces of Law, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 554-55 
(1992). 
105. P. 38. In an article written in 1991, however, Twining expressed a very 
"contextual" concept of law. While considering some unifying elements of the series "Law 
in Context" which he edited, Twining wrote: 
One possible solution might be to spell out a theory of law as a basis for the 
series as a whole. This, however, would almost certainly tum out to be either 
too vague to be useful or so dogmatic as to be both controversial and 
constricting. . . . Nearly all legal theories are contextual, with the possible 
exception ofKelsen's Pure Theory and its poor relations .... [A] characteristic 
of the tradition we are reacting against is that ... "theory'' is not considered as 
having a direct bearing on "practice," which would include the practice oflegal 
writing. 
William Twining, Reflections on 'Law in Context, 'in LAW IN CONTEXT, supra note 17, at 44. 
A possible explanation would be that while these remarks were written in the context of a 
particular (English) text-book series, in regard to globalization and legal theory the approach 
is, and should be, quite different. 
106. Dworkin, supra note 39, at 1-9. 
107. Ronald Dworkin, Law and Morals, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, 
473-74 (Ted Honderich ed. 1995). 
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Empire, he states: "This book takes up the internal, participants' point 
of view; it tries to grasp the argumentative character of our legal 
practice by joining that practice and struggling with the issue of 
soundness and truth participants face."108 Andrei Marmor depicted 
that quality of being multifaceted well, claiming that Dworkin's 
theory of "law as interpretation" successfully challenges the 
traditional division between "what is law?" and "what is (or should 
be) the law on a given issue?"109 
It is no wonder, therefore, that Dworkin's theory can be 
depicted by him or by others either as of a gep.eral or a particular 
nature (granted that his main source of inspiration is the practice of 
the American Supreme Court). Yet, Twining was right in pointing to 
several general aspects of his theory.no To those one can add 
Dworkin's criticism of pragmatism,11 1 his analytical distinction 
between the pre-interpretive, interpretive, and post-interpretive 
stages,112 and many others.113 
To conclude, the depiction of a legal theory-either by its 
author or by others-can be explained, in many cases, by one's view 
on the notion of acontextual law. As long as one does not believe in 
such an independent concept, she will mostly tum to the theory's 
particular aspects. In the case that one does, she will find no 
difficulty in ascribing general aspects to the theory. Finally, if one 
challenges the very distinction between contextual and acontextual 
"law," it is most likely that her theory could be depicted as either 
particular or general. 
108. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 14. 
109. Mannor, supra note 96, at 35 ("Dworkin's theory of Law as Interpretation 
challenges this conceptual division. On the thesis that 'law is· interpretive throughout,' 
Dworkin argues not only that accounting for the concept of law is a matter of interpretation, 
but also, and more interestingly, that such accounts are inevitably tied up with considerations 
ofwhat the law is there to settle."). 
110. See supra, notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
111. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 30, at 151-75. 
112. Id. at 65-68. 
113. See also Boe, supra note 48, at 10. While depicting Dworkin's theory as an 
example of a particular jurisprudence ("a theory which tried to analyze and explain only 
one's own legal system"), he adds that this description is true only to a limited extent: 
"However, [Dworkin's] theories of particular legal system are examples of a general 
(interpretive) approach to all social practices. There is thus at least that one general claim: 
that this interpretive approach is appropriate for understanding all legal systems." Id. at 10, 
n.4. 
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N. 	 TowARDS GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
Globalization and Legal Theory can be seen as a "preliminary 
exploration ofhow far the ideas ofsome mainstream Anglo-American 
jurists might be responsive to the challen1es of globalization and the 
need for a new general jurisprudence."11 The structure of the main 
argument can be broken into two pieces. First, Twining defines 
globalization and presents the challenges posed by it to legal theory. 
Emphatically, this part concludes with a call for a new concept of 
general jurisprudence. Second, Twining suggests a historical and 
analytical survey of ~eneral jurisprudence as discussed by familiar, 
mainstream jurists. I I As already mentioned, however, Twining 
refrains from providing a detailed account of the content of this new 
general jurisprudence. A claim could be made that once we have 
established the meaning of globalization on the one hand, and of the 
(original) concept of general jurisprudence on the other, there exists a 
need for synthesizing the two, by presenting the concept of general 
jurisprudence in the age of globalization. Surely this Review Essay is 
not the proper forum for such a daunting task. A preliminary sketch, 
however, may be in order. Hence the structure of this part. 
First, I suggest looking into the main tenets of, or d.Hving 
forces behind, globalization. I agree with Twining that these are, 
primarily, world economic markets and technological innovations, 
particularly the Intemet.116 To these, I would add the trend towards 
democratization. Next, I argue that the new jurisprudence should 
reflect and respond to these forces. I further suggest that some 
modem American movements-mainly law and economics, 
feminism, and critical race studies (which the book mostly passes 
over with silence )-in fact respond to these trends. Finally, I propose 
considering a transnational version of these theories as possible basis 
ofthe new general jurisprudence. 
114. Twining summarizes the project in this way on p. 195. 
115. On p. 14, Twining justifies the choice he made with the following: "I have found 
that starting with the familiar and mainstream has been helpful to me in trying to get to grips 
with issues that are bewildering in their range, complexity, and pace ofchange." 
116. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
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A. Some Thoughts on Globalization 
Twining's account of globalization relies mainly on 
authorities from the first half of the 1990s, most of whom are non­
American. It would be useful, then, to begin our journey with a brief 
overview of some of the recent American scholarship on the issue. 
"Globalization," writes Louis Henkin, is "a new word, a new 
development, a new phenomenon, that has become almost a 
buzzword. State socialism is gone, and state capitalism, too, is giving 
way to privatization. A global economy is lar~ely replacing and 
overwhelming national and regional economies." 17 Echoing these 
ideas, Mark Tushnet noted: "[t]he current buzz-word about the 
economy is globalization. In one aspect, globalization entails a 
reduction in the power of existing governments to regulate economic 
activity."118 Adding a technological aspect to this account, Saskia 
Sassen states, "[t]he growth of a global economy in conjunction with 
the new telecommunications and computer networks that span the 
world has profoundly reconfigured institutions, fundamental to 
processes of governance and accountability in the modem state."119 
One of the most comprehensive accounts of the term is provided by 
the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. In his book, The 
Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, 12 °Friedman 
defmes globalization as · 
the inexorable integration ofmarkets, nation-states and 
technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a 
117. Henkin, supra note 3, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). He continues: "Companies 
created in one country are headquartered in another with branches and subsidiaries, or mines 
and factories, in third or fourth or fifth or more countries. Multinational companies are 
swallowing up national companies, and finding themselves subject to the confusion and 
inefficiency ofcompeting sovereignties." Id. 
118. Tushnet, supra note 36, at 11. 
119. SASKIA SUSSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 
xi-xii (1995). She goes on to say, "State sovereignty, nation-based citizenship, the 
institutional apparatus in charge of regulating the economy, such as central banks and 
monetary policies-all of these institutions are being destabilized and even transformed as a 
result ofglobalization and the new technologies." Id. Cf Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, 
Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 375, 378 (1996) 
("The origins of the concept 'globalization' can be traced back to the writings of Wendell 
Wilkie and the Club of Rome. These early formulations, however, occurred prior to the 
collapse of Bretton-Woods and the development of the new global communications 
technology. [With] the macroeconomic and technological preconditions for globalization ... 
firmly in place, the modem meaning of 'globalization' implies a global perspective of the 
particular area of study, a perspective which arises from the increased interdependence of 
national institutions and national economies.") (footnotes omitted). 
120. FRIEDMAN, supra note 60. 
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way that is enabling individuals, corporations and 
nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, 
deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that 
is enabling the world to reach into individuals, 
corporations and nation states farther, faster, deeper, 
cheaper than ever before. This process of global­
ization is also producing a powerful backlash from 
those brutalized or left behind by this new system.121 
Naturally, the economical changes did not happen. in a 
political vacuum. Closely linked to the market-oriented part of 
globalization, therefore, one can find the tendency toward 
democratization.122 Mark Tushnet opened his 1998 Supreme Court 
Foreword with the following description: "[t]he decade of the 1990s 
saw a wave of constitutional transformations around the world. The 
most dramatic constitutional changes have involved the overthrow of 
totalitarian governments. No less important have ·been 
transformations that have helped turn modern welfare states from a 
focus on a command-and-control regulation to market-oriented 
regulation."123 Noble Prize laureate economist Gary S. Becker 
observed that "democracy is the soil where capitalism flourishes 
best."124 And Robert Dahl, a prominent political scientist, argued that 
121. Id. at 9. Friedman further discusses eight defining characteristics of globalization. 
First, he asserts, "the driving idea behind globalization is free market capitalism." Second, 
the spread of"Americanization-from Big Macs to iMacs to Mickey Mouse" is a prevailing 
notion. Third, "globalization has its own defining technologies: computerization, 
miniaturization, digitization, satellite communications, fiber optics and the Internet, which 
reinforce its defining perspective of integration." Fourth, "the defining measurement of the 
globalization system is speed." Fifth, the "essence of globalization economics .. , is the 
notion that 'innovation replaces tradition.' The present-or perhaps the future--replaces the 
past." Sixth, businesses are situated in "a worldwide competition." Seventh, globalization 
has its own demographic pattern, "a rapid acceleration of movement of people frotn rural 
areas and agricultural lifestyle to urban areas and urban lifestyle more intimately linked with 
global fashion, food, markets and entertainment trends." Eighth and last, the three balances 
around which the globalization system is built: the traditional balance between nation states; 
a more recent one between nation states and global markets; and finally, the newest of all, 
that between super-empowered individuals and nation states. Id. at 9-15. 
122. I do not claim that a democratic regime is a precondition to participating in the 
global game. China, arguably a major player in the global markets, could serve as a distinct 
counter example. I do claim, however, that economic markets free from governmental 
intervention, as well as free cyber-markets of ideas-two of the main pillars of 
globalization-are bound to flourish in regimes in which the right to have them is 
institutionally protected. 
123. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New 
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
29, 29 (1999). 
124. GARY S. BECKER & GUITY NASHAT BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE, 241-68 
(1996) (reviewing approvingly the tum of several regimes towards democracy and open 
markets). 
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"Democracy and market-capitalism are like two persons bound in a 
tempestuous marriage that is riven by conflict and yet endures 
because neither partner wishes to separate from the other. . . . The 
two exist in a kind of antagonistic symbiosis."125 Thus seen, 
democratization-or, more accurately, the tendency towards it-can 
also be seen as a defining phenomenon ofglobalization. That, in turn, 
creates some new challenges for models of democracy in the era of 
globalization, but we can leave this issue for another time.126 
B. Globalization Themes and Legal Theories 
What is the proper relation between these three phenomena­
the opening of economic markets, the pervasiveness of the Internet, 
and the · tendency towards democracy-and a new general 
jurisprudence? Globalization and Legal Theory provides no 
discussion on this point.127 It seems that properly designed, a new 
general theory should respond to or at least reflect some of these 
elements. Indeed, if there is any justification for the emergence of a 
new legal theory in the age of globalization-be it general or other­
it is to be found in the novelty of the globalization itself, its causes 
and dominant features. 
Are there theories that do respond to these roots of 
globalization? At the unavoidable risk of being charged with 
125. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY, 166-79 (1998) (analyzing how market 
capitalism both harms and favors democracy). 
126. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, Rethinking Democracy for a More Global Age: The 
Cosmopolitan Model, in MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 353-60 (2d ed. 1996). David Held 
suggests "the creation of new political institutions which would coexist with the system of 
states but which would override states in clearly defined spheres of activity where those 
activities have demonstrable transnational and international consequences." Id. at 354. Cf 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (suggesting a decentralized model of American democracy, in 
which regional and national-level bodies would serve in coordinating and knowledge­
assimilating functions). 
127. In fact, the book deals directly with globalization and its causes only at the very 
beginning-while introducing the term-and close to the end, as part of his review of 
Santos's book. The main body of the work contains very little, if any, discussion of issues 
such as the Internet. A striking demonstration of that can be found in Calvino's Invisible 
Cities. Although Twining cites extensively from this book and even suggests including it as 
a part of the juristic canon, he never mentions Calvino's 1972 vision (or was it a prophecy?) 
of the World Wide Web. CALVINO, supra note 57, at 76 ("In Ersilia, to establish the 
relationships that sustain the city's life, the inhabitants stretch strings from the comers of the 
houses, white or black or gray or black-and-white according to [their nature]. When the 
strings become so numerous that you can no longer pass among them, the inhabitants leave 
. . . [and] only the strings remain ... spider webs of intricate relationship seeking a form."). 
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oversimplification, one may dare a positive answer. Law and 
Economics may have something to say on the behavior-whether 
rational128 or less so129--0f people in world economic markets, as 
well as to define, analyze, and elucidate the markets themselves. 
Legal Feminism may propose creative models of cooperation and 
sharing that are not based on masculine paradigms of "all or 
nothing."130 These models may influence new regulatof?' schemes 
for the Internet, as well as other shared technologies. 13 Finally, 
128. "Rational-choice" law and economics is identified, more than anyone else, with 
Richard Posner. See genera/Qi ECONOMIC .ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-4 (5th ed. 1998) (opening his 
book with the claim that "economics is the science ofrational choice in the world"); see also 
Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1551 (1998) ("The editors of the Review have asked me to comment on [a behavioral 
economics] paper, no doubt because of my identification with rational-choice economics."). 
The rationality assumption itself, as Posner demonstrates it, is deceptively simple: 
[w]hat I mean by the word [rationality is] choosing the best means to the 
chooser's ends. For example, a rational person who wants to keep warm will 
compare the alternative means known to him ofkeeping warm in terms of cost, 
comfort, and other dimensions ofutility and disutility, and will choose from this 
array the means that achieves warmth with the greatest margin of benefit over 
cost, broadly defined. Rational choice need not be conscious choice. Rats arc 
as least as rational as human beings when rationality is defined as achieving 
one's ends ... at least cost. 
Id. 
129. The inaugural paper on behavioral law and economics, on which Posner was asked 
to respond, is Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1471 (1998). The new movement, following the 
original Behavioral Economics and based upon psychological experiment, challenged the 
notion that human beings function as merely utility maximizers. As expected, soon symposia 
were conducted (see, e.g., Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human 
Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998)) and books 
began to appear (see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LA\V AND ECONOMICS (2000)). 
Daniel Farber, however, warns us from a premature catharsis: "it is too soon to say whether 
behavioral law and economics will be a successful new paradigm. We are a long way from 
complete science ofhuman behavior, ifindeed such a thing will ever exist. In the meantime, 
legal scholars will find much to learn from rational choice theory, from cognitive 
psychology, and from other social sciences. But premature efforts to package this 
information as a new interdisciplinary 'movement' may not be helpful." Daniel Farber, 
Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, id). 
130. The classic text is CAROL GILLIGAN, IN ADIFFERENT VOICE (1982). By now there is 
a voluminous literature within Legal Feminism on those issues. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A 
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEG. ED 3 (1988), reprinted in CHRISTIE 
& MARTIN, supra note 39, at 1083, 1086 ("Men have constructed an adversary system, with 
its competitive, sparring style, for the resolution of legal problems. In many ways, it is an 
intellectualized substitute for dueling or medieval jousting. Much of legal practice is a win­
Iose performance . . . we can question whether a competitive, win-lose approach is 
necessary. . . . When we look anew for methods for resolving conflicts, we may decide that 
win-lose, adversary methods are not the only, or not the best, or even not a preferable method 
for dispute resolution. Perhaps we could design alternative models that incorporate the 
perspectives ofwomen and men."). 
131. To be sure, Feminism is not the only source from which one can draw new 
paradigms for cooperation. In international law such calls are by now well-established. See, 
2001] REVIEW ESSAY 	 819 
although democracy is ::Probably the "least of the evils" in terms of 
forms of government,13 it is equally true that even in such a regime, 
some groups and individuals are left behind. In particular, when 
democracy adopts values such as competition, utility maximization, 
and efficiency-all directly connected with the new culture of market 
economy-the tendency to harm individuals and groups who cannot 
adapt to the change may increase.133 To that end, a theory that takes 
the minority perspective, such as Critical Race Theory, can be of 
help.134 
To be sure, the factors I considered to stand at the heart of 
globalization are by no means conclusive. So are the possible 
theories that may correspond to them. Yet the main move from 
theory to its subject is, in my mind, essential. Accordingly, every 
attempt to justify a new theory for the age of globalization should be 
e.g., .ABRAM CHAYES & ANTIONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1-28 (1998) (suggesting a theory of 
compliance, rather than the contemporary enforcement model in treaties regulation, that 
relies primarily on a cooperative, problem-solving approach instead of a coercive one). With 
that, international law, though prominent in the context of globalization, is but a particular 
field, and our interest here is in a new general legal theory. 
132. 	 The full citation ofChurchill's classic comment is: 

Many forms ofgovernment have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin 

and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has 

been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time. 
Winston Churchill, Speech, House ofCommons, Nov. 11, 1947, in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: 
His COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7566 (Robert James ed. 1974). 
133. "Economic actors motivated by self-interest have little incentive for tal<ing the good 
of others into account; on the contrary, they have powerful incentives for ignoring the good 
ofothers ifby doing so they themselves stand no gain." DAHL, supra note 125, at 174. 
134. Here, again, the amount of literature is daunting. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Race 
Consciousness: The Thematic Content ofRacial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1864-65 (1990), which states: 
Minority perspectives make explicit the need for fundamental change in the 
ways we think and construct lmowledge. In the context of this Response and 
Critical Race literature in general, the term "perspective"-rendered ambiguous 
by limitations oflanguage-connotes a typification of minority points of view. 
Exposing how minority cultural viewpoints differ from white cultural 
viewpoints requires a delineation of the complex set of social interactions 
through which minority consciousness has developed. Distinguishing the 
consciousness of racial minorities requires aclmowledgment of the feelings and 
intangible modes of perception unique to those who have .historically been 
socially, structurally, and intellectually marginalized in the United States .... 
Critical Race Theorists are attempting to integrate their experiential lmowledge, 
drawn from a shared history as "other," with their ongoing struggles to 
transform a world deteriorating under the albatross ofracial hegemony. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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proved, first and foremost, to be able to respond to globalization 
itself. 135 
C. Integrating Legal Theory and Globalization 
The last part of my argument responds to a justified critique 
voiced by Twining on modem American legal theories. "What is 
striking about them," Twining writes, "is that they are almost 
exclusively American in focus, sources and cultural assumptions."136 
The required remedy, then, is to shift the focus of those theories from 
the parochial and particular towards the multinational and general. 
Another predicament may arise from the very unison of 
different theories into one. Which will determine in the case of 
conflict? Should one prefer a utility-maximizing solution or one 
based on corrective justice? What would be the criterion for deciding 
between different, sometimes opposing views? One possibility would 
be that the answer is contingent upon proper identification of the 
source of difficulty. If, for example, the problem is caused by a 
phenomenon that relates to economic markets, a utility-maximizing 
rule may have prominence. However, if the problem arises in the 
context of technological sharing, we will turn to corresponding ideas 
from the school offeminism. But what ifthe source is unidentifiable? 
What if it would be exactly the mix of several components that calls 
for determination? To that I have no answer. I bear in mind Sir 
Isaiah Berlin's warning of the heresy of one compatible theory. 137 
135. Thus I reject a possible claim that my analysis imitates Twining's, just in a different 
time and space. My reliance on current American theories stems from my strong belief that 
they respond to elements that are essential to globalization. 
136. P. 58. For accuracy's sake, I will mention that in this passage Twining referred to 
Economic Analysis of Law and Critical Legal Studies-both movements which are not 
discussed elsewhere. Feminist legal ideas are mentioned sporadically, but Twining admits 
that the book "has not attempted to do justice to them" (p. 251). An example of such an 
injustice might be the attempt to examine Holmes' theory from the perspective of a "Bad 
Woman" (p. 125). As Twining well knows, at the time Holmes was writing, and not only 
then, the use ofsuch a term entailed severe moral judgment. See, e.g., Tenvilliger v. Wands, 
17. N.Y. 54 (1858), cited in JANE GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 99 {3d ed. 1996) ("Action for 
slander. The plaintiff proved by Wands that the defendant asked him, Wands, why the 
plaintiff was running to Mrs. Fuller so much for he knew he went there with no good 
purpose. Mrs. Fuller was a bad woman, and plaintiff had a regular beaten path across his 
land to Fuller's") (emphasis added). 
137. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167 (1969) 
("One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars 
of the great historical ideals-justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or 
the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which 
demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This is the belief that 
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But I also would like to believe that in time a new eclectic 
comprehensive general jurisprudence would emerge, one that can 
respond to almost every facet of this very complex phenomenon. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Globalization is an extremely broad subject of study. Legal 
theory may be one of the few which is even more broad. A book 
about globalization and legal theory may easily turn, therefore, into a 
futile attempt to cover these two infinite oceans. Twining's book, in 
contrast, is a work bridging the two. That alone is one of the most 
important virtues of his book. In addition, Twining's report provides 
an indispensable analytical and historical background of the concept 
of general jurisprudence. In this Review Essay I have tried to show 
that in addition to that account, it is possible to outline some 
substantive features of that new general theory. I hope that Twining' s 
call for further debate on this issue will be answered: it is in the best 
interest of all ofus. 
somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual 
thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the dimpled heart of an 
uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that 
all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and 
perhaps even entail one another."). 
